Inhibit System Recovery (T1490)
Inhibit System Recovery [T1490]
Last updated
Inhibit System Recovery [T1490]
Last updated
Name: Inhibit System Recovery
ID: T1490
Tactics:
"Inhibit System Recovery" (MITRE ATT&CK ID: T1490) is a technique defined within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, categorized under the "Impact" tactic. Attackers utilize this technique to prevent the recovery of compromised systems, ensuring persistence, causing prolonged downtime, and complicating remediation efforts. By disabling or corrupting built-in system recovery mechanisms, adversaries significantly extend the duration and impact of their attacks.
Attackers executing the "Inhibit System Recovery" technique primarily target built-in recovery features and backup mechanisms to hinder remediation and prolong their foothold in compromised environments.
Technical execution methods and mechanisms include:
Disabling Windows Recovery Options:
Attackers can disable the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) by modifying or deleting recovery partition data or disabling recovery-related services.
Commands such as reagentc.exe /disable can be executed to disable Windows recovery options.
Registry keys associated with system recovery (e.g., HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore) can be modified or deleted to prevent system restore functionality.
Deleting or Encrypting Backup Data:
Attackers may deliberately remove or encrypt backup files stored locally or on network shares to ensure affected systems cannot easily be restored.
Tools such as ransomware variants frequently encrypt backup files (e.g., .bak, .vhd, .vhdx, .bkf) to inhibit recovery.
Corrupting Boot Configuration Data (BCD):
Adversaries can corrupt or delete the Boot Configuration Data store, making it difficult or impossible to boot into recovery modes.
Commands like bcdedit /deletevalue {default} recoverysequence or directly deleting/modifying BCD files (\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCD) can be employed.
Tampering with Volume Shadow Copies:
Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) snapshots, crucial for recovery, can be deleted or disabled using utilities such as vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet.
Attackers may disable the VSS service or manipulate its configuration to prevent further snapshots from being created.
"Inhibit System Recovery" typically appears in various attack scenarios and stages, including:
Ransomware Attacks:
Attackers commonly disable or delete recovery mechanisms before encrypting critical data, ensuring victims have fewer options besides paying the ransom.
Destructive Malware Attacks:
Malware designed to cause maximum disruption (e.g., wipers) employs this technique to ensure the damage is permanent and recovery is difficult or impossible.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs):
Sophisticated adversaries may use this technique as part of their persistence strategy, ensuring that compromised systems cannot easily revert to a known good state.
Sabotage and Cyber Warfare:
Nation-state actors may utilize this technique to disrupt critical infrastructure or governmental operations, causing prolonged outages and increased remediation costs.
Post-Exploitation Stages:
Typically employed after gaining initial access and escalating privileges, attackers use this technique to solidify their presence and complicate incident response efforts.
Detection methods, tools, and specific indicators of compromise (IoCs) for "Inhibit System Recovery" include:
Monitoring System Logs and Event IDs:
Windows Event Logs can indicate the disabling of recovery features, such as:
Event ID 8193 (VSS errors or warnings).
Event ID 524 (System Restore disabled).
Event ID 1102 (Audit log cleared).
Regular review and alerting on these event IDs can provide early detection.
File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):
Monitoring modifications or deletions of critical system files and configurations:
Boot configuration data (\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCD).
Recovery partitions and backup files.
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Solutions:
EDR tools can detect suspicious command-line executions and process behaviors associated with this technique, such as:
Execution of vssadmin delete shadows.
Execution of reagentc.exe /disable.
Modification of registry keys related to system restore.
Behavioral Analysis and SIEM Correlation:
Correlating multiple suspicious activities, such as disabling backups, deleting shadow copies, or tampering with boot configurations, can indicate an active attack employing this technique.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
Presence of ransomware notes or encrypted backup files.
Missing or corrupted system restore points.
Disabled or non-functional Windows recovery environment.
Early detection of "Inhibit System Recovery" is critical due to the severe impact it can have on systems and networks. Potential impacts include:
Extended Downtime and Business Disruption:
Organizations unable to quickly recover systems face prolonged outages, impacting operations, revenue, and customer trust.
Increased Recovery Costs:
Without functioning backups or recovery mechanisms, organizations face significant expenses in rebuilding infrastructure, restoring data, and engaging incident response teams.
Facilitating Ransomware Success:
Attackers disabling recovery mechanisms increase the likelihood that victims will pay ransom demands due to lack of viable recovery options.
Loss of Critical Data:
Permanent data loss can occur if backups and recovery methods are disabled or destroyed, significantly impacting business continuity.
Complicating Incident Response Efforts:
Incident responders face increased complexity and extended timelines when recovery mechanisms are inhibited, allowing attackers to maintain persistence longer and potentially cause greater damage.
Therefore, timely detection and response are essential to minimize damages, reduce costs, and maintain operational resilience.
Real-world examples involving "Inhibit System Recovery" include:
NotPetya Malware Attack (2017):
Attack Scenario:
NotPetya malware spread rapidly across global networks, encrypting critical data and disabling recovery mechanisms.
Techniques and Tools Used:
Utilized commands like vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet to delete shadow copies.
Corrupted Master Boot Record (MBR) and boot configurations, preventing recovery.
Impact:
Caused billions of dollars in damages globally, with significant downtime and data loss.
Ryuk Ransomware Attacks (2018-Present):
Attack Scenario:
Targeted large enterprises and healthcare organizations, encrypting data and disabling recovery options.
Techniques and Tools Used:
Deleted shadow copies using vssadmin.
Disabled Windows System Restore and backup services.
Impact:
Victims faced extensive downtime, operational disruptions, and were often forced to pay substantial ransom demands.
DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline (2021):
Attack Scenario:
Colonial Pipeline faced ransomware infection, resulting in operational shutdown and fuel supply disruptions.
Techniques and Tools Used:
Attackers disabled recovery mechanisms, encrypted backups, and deleted shadow copies.
Impact:
Major disruption of fuel supply chains across the U.S. East Coast, causing significant economic and logistical impacts.
Shamoon Malware Attack on Saudi Aramco (2012):
Attack Scenario:
Shamoon malware targeted Saudi Aramco, destroying data and inhibiting recovery.
Techniques and Tools Used:
Wiped master boot records, corrupted boot configurations, and disabled recovery mechanisms.
Impact:
Approximately 30,000 workstations rendered unusable, causing significant operational disruption and financial damage.
These examples highlight the severity and real-world consequences of attackers employing the "Inhibit System Recovery" technique, underscoring the importance of vigilant detection and prevention strategies.