Windows Credential Manager
Windows Credential Manager [T1555.004]
Information
Introduction
Windows Credential Manager (T1555.004) is a sub-technique within the MITRE ATT&CK framework under Credential Access (T1555). This technique involves adversaries targeting the Windows Credential Manager, a built-in Windows feature designed to securely store user credentials such as usernames, passwords, and certificates. Attackers exploit this mechanism to extract stored credentials, enabling further lateral movement, privilege escalation, or persistent access within compromised environments.
Deep Dive Into Technique
Windows Credential Manager stores credentials securely in an encrypted vault on Windows systems, allowing users to authenticate seamlessly to various resources without manually re-entering their credentials. Credentials stored may include:
Web credentials (usernames, passwords, URLs)
Windows credentials (network shares, remote desktop credentials, domain credentials)
Application-specific credentials (Microsoft Office, VPN clients, etc.)
Attackers typically leverage several methods to extract or abuse credentials stored in the Credential Manager:
Direct Credential Dumping via Command-Line Tools:
Attackers may use built-in utilities or custom scripts to directly query and extract credentials.
Example built-in commands:
cmdkey /list– lists stored credentials (though passwords are not directly displayed).PowerShell scripts or custom tools can retrieve credentials from memory or disk.
Third-Party Credential Dumping Tools:
Tools such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, or CredentialManager module (PowerShell) are frequently used.
Mimikatz command example:
LaZagne example:
PowerShell Credential Manager module:
API Calls and Custom Malware:
Attackers may leverage Windows API functions such as
CredEnumerate,CredRead, andCredWriteto interact directly with Credential Manager.Custom malware can silently enumerate and exfiltrate stored credentials without user interaction.
Persistence and Continuous Credential Harvesting:
Attackers may establish persistence mechanisms that periodically extract and exfiltrate credentials to maintain access and monitor changes.
When this Technique is Usually Used
Attackers typically leverage Windows Credential Manager credential dumping across various attack stages and scenarios, including:
Initial Access and Reconnaissance:
Early stages after initial compromise to identify stored credentials that facilitate lateral movement.
Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement:
Extracting credentials of privileged accounts stored locally to move laterally across the network or escalate privileges.
Persistence and Long-term Access:
Continuously harvesting updated credentials to maintain persistent access, especially after password rotations or change management.
Data Exfiltration and Credential Harvesting Campaigns:
Credential harvesting campaigns aimed at stealing credentials for further exploitation, sale, or reuse in credential stuffing attacks.
Insider Threat Scenarios:
Malicious insiders or compromised users extracting stored credentials to access sensitive resources beyond their authorized permissions.
How this Technique is Usually Detected
Detection of Windows Credential Manager credential dumping typically involves monitoring specific behaviors, commands, tools, and indicators of compromise (IoCs):
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Tools:
Monitor and alert on suspicious use of credential dumping tools (e.g., Mimikatz, LaZagne).
Detect suspicious API calls to Credential Manager (e.g., CredEnumerate, CredRead).
Process and Command-Line Monitoring:
Detect unusual execution of commands such as
cmdkey /list.Monitor PowerShell scripts or modules accessing Credential Manager (e.g., CredentialManager module).
Behavioral Analytics and UEBA (User and Entity Behavior Analytics):
Identify anomalous credential access patterns, such as unusual credential enumeration or extraction activities from user accounts or endpoints.
Windows Event Logs:
Monitor Windows Security Logs, Sysmon logs, and Application logs for suspicious events related to credential access.
Event ID 4672 (Special privileges assigned), 4688 (Process creation), or Sysmon Event ID 10 (Process Access) can provide valuable indicators.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
Presence of known credential dumping tools (Mimikatz, LaZagne binaries or scripts).
Suspicious PowerShell scripts or binaries accessing Credential Manager APIs.
Unusual outbound traffic patterns indicating credential exfiltration.
Why it is Important to Detect This Technique
Early detection of credential dumping from Windows Credential Manager is critical due to the severe impacts it can have on organizations, including:
Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement:
Compromised credentials can enable attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally across the network, and gain deeper access to sensitive resources.
Data Breaches and Exfiltration:
Stolen credentials can lead directly to unauthorized access to sensitive data, intellectual property theft, and large-scale data breaches.
Persistent Access and Difficulty of Remediation:
Attackers with continuous credential harvesting capabilities can maintain persistent and stealthy access, complicating incident response and remediation efforts.
Increased Risk of Credential Abuse:
Extracted credentials can be leveraged in credential stuffing attacks, phishing campaigns, or sold on underground marketplaces, leading to further compromise.
Compliance and Regulatory Impact:
Failure to detect and respond to credential theft can result in compliance violations, regulatory fines, and reputational damage.
Thus, prompt detection and response to credential dumping from Windows Credential Manager significantly reduces the risk of serious security incidents and mitigates potential damage.
Examples
Several real-world incidents and scenarios illustrate the use of Windows Credential Manager credential dumping:
APT29 (Cozy Bear) Operations:
Known to leverage tools like Mimikatz to extract credentials from Credential Manager during espionage campaigns targeting government and private sector organizations.
Attackers utilized stolen credentials to move laterally and access sensitive information.
FIN7 Cybercrime Group:
FIN7 frequently used credential dumping tools (Mimikatz, PowerShell-based scripts) to extract credentials from compromised point-of-sale (POS) systems and corporate networks.
Extracted credentials facilitated lateral movement, privilege escalation, and ultimately data exfiltration of payment card information.
TrickBot Malware Campaigns:
TrickBot malware includes modules specifically designed to extract credentials stored in Credential Manager.
Credential theft enabled attackers to conduct further financial fraud and ransomware deployment (e.g., Ryuk ransomware).
Red Team Assessments and Penetration Tests:
Security testers frequently demonstrate Credential Manager credential extraction using tools such as LaZagne or custom PowerShell scripts to illustrate potential attack vectors and risks.
These assessments highlight the importance of securing credential storage and detecting credential extraction activities proactively.
These examples emphasize the widespread use of this technique across various threat groups and attack scenarios, underscoring the importance of robust detection and response capabilities.
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