Data from Configuration Repository

Data from Configuration Repository [T1602]

Information

• Name: Data from Configuration Repository

• ID: T1602

• Tactics: TA0009

• Sub-Technique: T1602.002, T1602.001

Introduction

Data from Configuration Repository is a technique categorized under MITRE ATT&CK's tactic of Credential Access (T1552.002). Attackers leverage this method to extract sensitive information, such as credentials, keys, tokens, or other valuable configuration data, from repositories or files that store configuration data. Configuration repositories can include files, registries, databases, configuration management systems, or cloud storage systems. Adversaries target these repositories to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or facilitate lateral movement within compromised environments.

Deep Dive Into Technique

Attackers exploiting Data from Configuration Repository typically focus on extracting sensitive or privileged information stored within configuration files or repositories. These repositories can exist in various forms, including:

• Plaintext configuration files (.ini, .xml, .json, .yaml, .conf files)

• Configuration management databases (CMDBs)

• Cloud storage buckets (AWS S3, Azure Blob Storage, Google Cloud Storage)

• System registries (Windows Registry)

• Infrastructure-as-code repositories (Terraform, Ansible, Chef, Puppet)

Attackers may employ various execution methods to access these repositories, such as:

• Direct file access and parsing configuration files stored on compromised endpoints or servers.

• Utilizing operating system commands or scripts (PowerShell, Bash, Python) to automate extraction and parsing.

• Exploiting misconfigured cloud storage buckets or repositories with weak authentication controls.

• Leveraging compromised administrative credentials or tokens to access configuration management systems or databases.

• Accessing registry keys containing sensitive data in Windows environments.

Common mechanisms attackers use include:

• Automated scripts or tools to scan and parse configuration files for credentials or sensitive data.

• Exploiting weak file permissions or configuration errors to access sensitive repositories.

• Utilizing stolen or compromised administrator accounts to access and extract sensitive data.

• Leveraging publicly exposed configuration files or repositories due to misconfigurations.

Real-world procedures often involve:

• Retrieving API keys, database credentials, or authentication tokens from configuration files.

• Extracting credentials from Windows registry keys used by services or applications.

• Accessing cloud storage buckets or configuration databases due to misconfigured access controls.

• Leveraging leaked or exposed configuration repositories from public repositories or code-sharing platforms.

When this Technique is Usually Used

Attackers can leverage Data from Configuration Repository across various attack scenarios and stages, including:

• Initial Access Stage: Attackers may exploit publicly exposed configuration repositories or cloud storage buckets to obtain initial foothold credentials or sensitive data.

• Credential Access Stage: Extracting credentials or sensitive tokens from configuration files or registries to escalate privileges or facilitate lateral movement.

• Privilege Escalation Stage: Utilizing sensitive configuration data (e.g., administrative credentials, API keys) to escalate privileges within the compromised environment.

• Lateral Movement Stage: Leveraging extracted credentials or tokens to move laterally across network segments, systems, or cloud environments.

• Persistence Stage: Using configuration data to establish persistent access through legitimate administrative accounts or API tokens.

• Exfiltration Stage: Extracting sensitive configuration data for external use, sale, or further exploitation.

How this Technique is Usually Detected

Detection methods for Data from Configuration Repository include:

• File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

  • Monitoring configuration files for unauthorized access or modification.

  • Alerting on unexpected file reads or unusual file access patterns.

• Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR):

  • Detecting suspicious scripts or processes accessing sensitive configuration files or repositories.

  • Identifying abnormal process behavior or command-line arguments associated with data extraction.

• Security Information and Event Management (SIEM):

  • Correlating logs from file access events, registry access, or cloud storage access events.

  • Identifying unusual patterns or spikes in configuration file access.

• Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM):

  • Detecting misconfigured cloud storage buckets or repositories that expose sensitive configuration data.

  • Alerting on unauthorized access attempts or data extraction from cloud configuration repositories.

• Behavioral Analytics:

  • Monitoring user and service account behavior for deviations from normal configuration access patterns.

  • Detecting unusual access times, locations, or frequency of sensitive configuration repository interactions.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) associated with this technique include:

• Unusual access or modification timestamps on sensitive configuration files.

• Suspicious scripts or executables accessing configuration files or registries.

• Unexpected API calls or access attempts to configuration storage services.

• Configuration files or registry keys accessed by unauthorized or unexpected user accounts.

• Presence of configuration files or sensitive data in unauthorized locations or external systems.

Why it is Important to Detect This Technique

Early detection of Data from Configuration Repository is critical due to the potential severe impacts on systems, networks, and organizations, including:

• Credential Compromise:

  • Attackers obtaining administrative credentials, API keys, or authentication tokens that grant high-level access to critical systems and services.

• Privilege Escalation:

  • Using extracted configuration data to escalate privileges and gain administrative or root-level access, significantly increasing attacker capabilities.

• Lateral Movement:

  • Leveraging credentials or tokens found in configuration repositories to move laterally across network segments, increasing the scope and severity of compromise.

• Data Exfiltration:

  • Extracting sensitive configuration information (credentials, encryption keys, proprietary information) to external locations, leading to data breaches and compliance violations.

• Operational Disruption:

  • Attackers altering or corrupting configuration data, causing service outages, downtime, or degraded system performance.

• Compliance and Regulatory Impact:

  • Exposure or breach of sensitive configuration data may lead to regulatory penalties, fines, loss of trust, and reputational damage.

Detecting and responding to this technique promptly limits attacker capabilities, mitigates potential damage, and reduces the risk of broader compromise or operational impact.

Examples

Real-world examples demonstrating the use of Data from Configuration Repository include:

• Uber Data Breach (2022):

  • Attackers accessed internal configuration repositories containing administrative credentials and API keys.

  • Leveraged extracted credentials to escalate privileges and move laterally within Uber's internal systems.

  • Impact included unauthorized access to sensitive customer and employee data and significant reputational damage.

• Capital One Breach (2019):

  • Attacker exploited misconfigured AWS S3 buckets that stored sensitive configuration data and credentials.

  • Accessed sensitive customer data, including personal information, financial records, and account details.

  • Resulted in regulatory fines, legal actions, and significant reputational harm.

• Imperva Data Breach (2019):

  • Attackers accessed cloud configuration repositories containing API keys and administrative credentials.

  • Enabled unauthorized access to Imperva's cloud database services, exposing customer data and API keys.

  • Resulted in service disruptions, customer notifications, and reputational damage.

• Codecov Supply Chain Attack (2021):

  • Attackers compromised Codecov's Bash Uploader script, enabling access to customers' configuration data (API keys, credentials, tokens).

  • Attackers leveraged stolen credentials to access sensitive customer repositories and systems.

  • Impact included widespread compromise of customer environments and significant remediation efforts.

Tools commonly used by attackers in these scenarios include:

• Custom scripts (Python, PowerShell, Bash) for automated extraction and parsing of configuration data.

• Cloud enumeration and exploitation tools (Scout Suite, CloudSploit, Pacu) to identify and exploit misconfigured cloud repositories.

• Credential extraction frameworks (Mimikatz, LaZagne) to retrieve sensitive data from configuration files or registries.

Impacts observed in these examples include:

• Unauthorized access to sensitive data and intellectual property.

• Significant financial losses due to remediation, legal fees, and fines.

• Reputational damage leading to decreased customer trust and business impact.

• Operational disruptions and downtime affecting business continuity.