Cloud Accounts
Cloud Accounts [T1078.004]
Last updated
Cloud Accounts [T1078.004]
Last updated
Name: Cloud Accounts
ID: T1078.004
Tactics: , , ,
Technique:
Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) is a sub-technique within the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the broader technique "Valid Accounts (T1078)." It involves adversaries compromising or abusing legitimate cloud service provider accounts to gain unauthorized access, maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or facilitate further attacks within cloud environments. Attackers typically leverage stolen credentials, credential stuffing, phishing attacks, or exploitation of weak authentication mechanisms to access and misuse cloud accounts.
Adversaries targeting cloud accounts primarily exploit authentication mechanisms and credential management practices. Key technical details and methods include:
Credential Theft and Reuse:
Attackers obtain cloud credentials through phishing campaigns, social engineering, leaked credentials databases, or malware infections.
Credential stuffing attacks utilize automated tools to systematically test stolen credentials against cloud authentication endpoints.
Exploiting Weak Authentication Configurations:
Attackers leverage accounts configured without multi-factor authentication (MFA) or with weak password policies.
Abuse of insecure APIs or misconfigured cloud resources that expose sensitive credentials.
Session Hijacking and Token Theft:
Attackers intercept or steal session tokens or authentication tokens, enabling unauthorized access without needing the original password.
Use of token replay attacks, where valid tokens are reused to gain access to cloud environments.
Privilege Escalation via Cloud IAM:
Attackers exploit overly permissive IAM (Identity and Access Management) policies or roles within cloud environments.
Manipulation of cloud IAM roles to escalate privileges or gain administrative access.
Persistence and Lateral Movement:
Attackers create additional cloud accounts, roles, or API keys to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Use compromised cloud accounts to move laterally between cloud resources, services, or even hybrid environments.
Automation and Scripting:
Use of automated scripts and tools to systematically enumerate cloud resources, extract sensitive data, or provision unauthorized resources.
Tools such as AWS CLI, Azure CLI, Google Cloud SDK, and open-source exploitation frameworks are commonly employed.
Attackers leverage cloud accounts at various stages of the cyber kill chain, including:
Initial Access:
Compromised cloud credentials can serve as an initial vector into cloud environments, bypassing perimeter defenses.
Persistence:
Creation of additional cloud accounts, API keys, or IAM users/roles ensures continued access even if initial credentials are revoked.
Privilege Escalation:
Exploiting IAM roles or misconfigured permissions to escalate privileges within the cloud environment.
Lateral Movement:
Using compromised cloud accounts to pivot between cloud services, resources, or hybrid on-premises/cloud infrastructures.
Data Exfiltration:
Cloud accounts enable attackers to access sensitive data stored in cloud storage services, databases, or other resources.
Impact and Resource Hijacking:
Attackers utilize compromised cloud accounts to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, cryptocurrency mining operations, or deploy malicious infrastructure.
Detection of compromised or abused cloud accounts involves multiple layers and approaches, including:
Monitoring and Alerting on Authentication Events:
Employing cloud-native logging and security services (AWS CloudTrail, Azure Monitor, Google Cloud Audit Logs) to track authentication attempts, account creations, and suspicious logins.
Alerting on unusual login patterns such as logins from unfamiliar IP addresses, impossible travel scenarios, or unusual login hours.
Behavioral Analytics and Anomaly Detection:
Implementing User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) to detect deviations from normal user behaviors and usage patterns.
Identifying anomalous API calls, unusual resource provisioning, or abnormal data access patterns.
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Enforcement and Monitoring:
Enforcing MFA policies to reduce credential compromise risks.
Monitoring and alerting on MFA bypass attempts or unusual MFA activity.
Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM) Tools:
Using CSPM solutions to detect misconfigurations, overly permissive IAM roles, and unauthorized resource creations.
Continuous monitoring of cloud account configurations and permissions.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
Unusual API calls or commands executed by cloud accounts.
Sudden or unexpected creation of new IAM roles, users, or API keys.
Detection of cloud resources provisioned in unfamiliar regions or services.
Increased billing or resource usage indicative of unauthorized resource utilization (e.g., crypto mining).
Early detection of compromised cloud accounts is crucial due to significant potential impacts, including:
Data Breaches and Data Loss:
Attackers with cloud account access can exfiltrate sensitive information, intellectual property, customer data, or personally identifiable information (PII).
Financial and Operational Impact:
Unauthorized resource provisioning can lead to substantial financial costs due to unexpected cloud service charges.
Attackers may disrupt business operations through resource hijacking or denial-of-service attacks.
Reputation and Compliance Risks:
Data breaches or unauthorized access incidents can severely damage organizational reputation and trust.
Organizations may face regulatory fines or legal consequences due to non-compliance with data protection regulations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS).
Persistence and Further Compromise:
Undetected compromised accounts enable attackers to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and move laterally, increasing the risk of widespread compromise.
Security Posture Degradation:
Attackers can alter cloud security configurations, weakening overall security posture and exposing the organization to future attacks.
Real-world incidents and examples involving compromised cloud accounts include:
Capital One Breach (2019):
Attackers exploited a misconfigured AWS IAM role to access sensitive data stored in Amazon S3 buckets.
Impact: Approximately 100 million customer records exposed, resulting in significant financial penalties and reputational damage.
Tesla Kubernetes Cluster Compromise (2018):
Attackers gained access to Tesla's AWS cloud account credentials due to an unsecured Kubernetes administrative console.
Attackers deployed cryptocurrency mining software on Tesla's cloud infrastructure, incurring unauthorized resource costs.
Uber AWS Account Compromise (2016):
Attackers obtained AWS cloud credentials stored insecurely in GitHub repositories.
Resulted in unauthorized access to sensitive data of approximately 57 million users and drivers, leading to significant regulatory fines and reputational harm.
Code Spaces Attack (2014):
Attackers gained access to AWS cloud account credentials and demanded ransom.
Upon refusal, attackers deleted cloud resources, effectively destroying the company's entire infrastructure and forcing its closure.
TeamTNT Cybercrime Group (2020-2021):
Attackers targeted cloud environments to steal AWS credentials and deploy cryptocurrency mining software.
Leveraged automated scripts and tools to systematically scan and compromise cloud accounts across multiple organizations.
In these examples, attackers exploited compromised cloud accounts through credential theft, misconfigurations, weak authentication practices, and insecure credential storage. The resulting impacts included financial losses, operational disruptions, data breaches, regulatory penalties, and severe reputational damage.