Odbcconf
Odbcconf [T1218.008]
Last updated
Odbcconf [T1218.008]
Last updated
Name: Odbcconf
ID: T1218.008
Tactics:
Technique:
The sub-technique Odbcconf (T1218.008) belongs to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the parent technique "Signed Binary Proxy Execution" (T1218). Attackers exploit legitimate, signed Windows binaries—such as Odbcconf.exe—to execute malicious payloads and scripts, bypassing security controls and detection mechanisms. Specifically, Odbcconf.exe is a native Windows utility intended for configuring ODBC data sources, drivers, and related settings. Adversaries misuse this legitimate binary to execute arbitrary commands, scripts, or DLL files, taking advantage of its trusted status to evade traditional detection and security systems.
Odbcconf is a legitimate Windows system binary typically located at %SystemRoot%\System32\odbcconf.exe. Its primary function is managing Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) configurations, including driver installations, removals, and data source configurations. Adversaries exploit this legitimate executable due to its ability to execute arbitrary DLL files and commands.
Technical details and execution methods include:
DLL Execution: Attackers can leverage Odbcconf.exe to execute arbitrary DLL files by using the syntax:
This command instructs Odbcconf to load and execute the specified DLL.
Command Execution via Response Files: Odbcconf.exe can execute commands specified within response files (text files containing command-line arguments). Attackers use this feature to obfuscate malicious commands, complicating detection:
The response file contains instructions such as loading malicious DLLs or executing commands.
Bypassing Application Whitelisting: Because Odbcconf.exe is a trusted, Microsoft-signed binary, it often bypasses application control solutions and whitelisting policies, allowing attackers to execute malicious payloads undetected.
Living-off-the-Land (LotL) Tactic: Attackers frequently use Odbcconf.exe as part of the LotL tactic, leveraging existing system binaries to minimize the risk of detection and reduce the need for external tools.
Attackers commonly use Odbcconf.exe in multiple attack scenarios and stages, including:
Initial Access and Execution: Attackers may use phishing or spear-phishing campaigns to deliver malicious payloads, then employ Odbcconf.exe to execute these payloads without raising alarms.
Defense Evasion: Odbcconf.exe is often leveraged to bypass security controls, such as application whitelisting, antivirus detection, and endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools.
Persistence: Attackers may use Odbcconf.exe to execute malicious DLLs or scripts that establish persistent backdoors, allowing continued access even after system reboots.
Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement: Once initial access is gained, attackers can employ Odbcconf.exe to load malicious payloads facilitating privilege escalation or lateral movement within the compromised network.
Detection of malicious Odbcconf.exe usage can be challenging due to its legitimate nature. However, several detection methods include:
Process Monitoring:
Monitoring process execution logs (Sysmon, Windows Event Logs) for unusual or unexpected execution of Odbcconf.exe, especially with suspicious command-line arguments such as /a {REGSVR or /f.
Command-Line Argument Analysis: Security tools and SIEM platforms can be configured to alert on Odbcconf.exe execution with uncommon arguments or referencing unusual file paths.
DLL Load Monitoring: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools can track and alert on suspicious DLL loads initiated by Odbcconf.exe, especially DLLs located in temporary directories or user-controlled locations.
Behavioral Analysis: Security monitoring systems can detect abnormal behavior patterns, such as Odbcconf.exe executing shortly after receiving phishing emails or downloading files from suspicious domains.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) include:
Execution of commands like:
Execution referencing uncommon response files:
DLL files residing in unusual directories (e.g., %TEMP%, %APPDATA%).
Network connections initiated by processes spawned by Odbcconf.exe.
Early detection of malicious Odbcconf.exe usage is crucial due to its potential impact on system and network security:
Security Control Bypass: Attackers exploit trusted system binaries to bypass traditional security controls, such as antivirus, application whitelisting, and endpoint protection tools.
Persistence and Long-Term Compromise: Malicious use of Odbcconf.exe can lead to persistent threats, allowing attackers long-term access and control over compromised systems.
Data Theft and Exfiltration: Attackers leveraging Odbcconf.exe can execute payloads designed for data harvesting, credential theft, and exfiltration of sensitive information.
Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement: Malicious payloads executed via Odbcconf.exe may facilitate privilege escalation, lateral movement across networks, and further compromise of critical infrastructure.
Difficult Detection and Attribution: Misuse of legitimate binaries complicates detection, attribution, and incident response efforts, highlighting the importance of proactive monitoring and detection capabilities.
Real-world examples and scenarios involving malicious usage of Odbcconf.exe include:
APT28 (Fancy Bear): This advanced persistent threat group has been observed using Odbcconf.exe to execute malicious payloads as part of targeted espionage campaigns. APT28 leveraged Odbcconf.exe to load malicious DLLs, bypassing security controls and maintaining persistence within victim networks.
FIN7 Cybercrime Group:
FIN7, known for targeted financial-sector attacks, employed Odbcconf.exe to execute malicious payloads, bypassing endpoint detection and response solutions. The group used response files (.rsp) containing malicious commands, complicating detection and analysis.
Commodity Malware Campaigns: Multiple commodity malware strains, such as TrickBot and Emotet, have leveraged Odbcconf.exe to execute malicious DLLs, evade detection, and establish persistent backdoors. Attackers frequently use phishing emails to deliver malicious payloads executed via Odbcconf.exe.
Typical attack scenario example:
Initial Access: Victim receives a phishing email containing a malicious attachment or link.
Payload Delivery and Execution:
Victim opens the attachment, downloading a malicious DLL to %TEMP% or %APPDATA%.
Execution via Odbcconf.exe: Attacker executes the malicious DLL via command:
Persistence and Lateral Movement: Malicious DLL establishes persistence, enabling further reconnaissance, credential theft, lateral movement, and eventual data exfiltration.
Impacts observed from these real-world examples include:
Unauthorized access and long-term persistence within victim environments.
Theft of sensitive data, credentials, and intellectual property.
Significant financial losses and reputational damage.
Compromise of critical infrastructure and sensitive government systems.
These examples illustrate the necessity for robust detection and monitoring strategies regarding Odbcconf.exe misuse.