Data from Removable Media
Data from Removable Media [T1025]
Last updated
Data from Removable Media [T1025]
Last updated
Name: Data from Removable Media
ID: T1025
Tactics:
The "Data from Removable Media" technique (T1025) in the MITRE ATT&CK framework refers to adversaries leveraging removable media devices (such as USB drives, external hard drives, DVDs, or SD cards) to transfer data into or out of targeted environments. Attackers frequently utilize this approach to circumvent network-based security controls, avoid detection, and exfiltrate sensitive information without generating noticeable network traffic. This technique is categorized under the "Exfiltration" tactic and poses significant challenges to organizations due to its stealthy nature and difficulty in monitoring removable devices.
Attackers employing the "Data from Removable Media" technique typically follow several technical procedures:
Physical Access or Insider Threats: Attackers or malicious insiders physically insert removable media into targeted systems to copy sensitive data onto external storage media. This method bypasses network-based detection and monitoring systems.
Malware and Automated Scripts: Malicious software installed on compromised machines can automatically detect connected removable media and silently transfer sensitive files or data onto these devices without user intervention.
Data Staging and Preparation: Attackers may first stage or compress data into archives (e.g., ZIP, RAR) or encrypt files before transferring them to removable media. This reduces the data footprint, making it less noticeable and easier to transport.
Steganography and Hidden Partitions: Attackers may hide stolen data in hidden partitions, encrypted volumes, or use steganographic methods to conceal data within seemingly harmless files (e.g., images, audio files) on removable media.
File System Manipulation: Attackers might manipulate file timestamps and metadata to obscure the timing and nature of data exfiltration activity.
Attackers commonly use the "Data from Removable Media" technique in various attack scenarios and stages, including:
Insider Threat Scenarios: Malicious insiders or disgruntled employees who have authorized access to sensitive data and physical access to endpoints.
Initial Access and Lateral Movement: Attackers who gain initial physical access to an organization's infrastructure or endpoints may use removable media to exfiltrate sensitive data before detection.
Air-Gapped Network Environments: In highly secure environments (such as critical infrastructure, military, or government facilities) where systems are intentionally disconnected from external networks, removable media is often the only practical means of exfiltration.
Final Stages of Cyber Espionage or Intellectual Property Theft: Attackers exfiltrating intellectual property, proprietary information, or classified data frequently use removable media to avoid detection by network monitoring systems.
Data Backup and Recovery Operations: Attackers may exploit legitimate backup or disaster recovery procedures involving removable media to covertly exfiltrate sensitive data.
Organizations can detect the "Data from Removable Media" technique through various detection methods, tools, and indicators of compromise (IoCs):
Endpoint Monitoring and Auditing:
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions that log and analyze USB/removable media insertion events.
File auditing and monitoring solutions that record file transfers and access events involving removable media.
Device Control Solutions:
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software configured to monitor, alert, or block unauthorized removable media usage.
Endpoint security policies enforcing strict control of removable media devices.
Behavioral Analysis and Anomaly Detection:
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems correlating endpoint logs to identify unusual or unauthorized removable media activity.
User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) solutions detecting anomalous user behavior involving removable media.
Forensic Analysis:
Digital forensic examination of endpoints to identify artifacts related to removable media usage, such as registry entries, file system logs, or shellbags.
Analysis of file metadata and timestamps to detect suspicious file copying or access patterns.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
Unusual file access or copying events logged by endpoint monitoring tools.
Detection of unknown or unauthorized removable media device identifiers (serial numbers, volume labels, device IDs).
Presence of encrypted or compressed archives created unexpectedly on user endpoints.
Discovery of hidden partitions or steganographic content on removable media.
Early detection of the "Data from Removable Media" technique is crucial due to its potential severe impacts on organizations, including:
Sensitive Data Loss:
Unauthorized data exfiltration can result in the loss of intellectual property, trade secrets, financial data, customer information, or classified documents.
Regulatory and Compliance Violations:
Data breaches involving removable media can lead to regulatory penalties, legal consequences, and compliance violations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS).
Reputational Damage:
Public disclosure of sensitive data breaches can damage an organization's reputation, erode customer trust, and negatively impact business operations.
Operational Disruption:
Investigating and remediating incidents involving removable media data exfiltration can disrupt normal business operations, consume resources, and incur significant financial costs.
Difficulty in Attribution and Remediation:
Due to the stealthy nature of removable media-based exfiltration, detecting and attributing the source of the breach can be challenging and time-consuming, delaying incident response efforts.
Real-world examples illustrating the "Data from Removable Media" technique include:
Edward Snowden Incident (2013):
Scenario: Snowden, a contractor at the NSA, exfiltrated classified documents using removable USB storage devices.
Tools Used: USB thumb drives and external disks.
Impact: Massive leak of classified NSA information, global diplomatic ramifications, and significant changes in cybersecurity policies.
Stuxnet Worm (2010):
Scenario: Stuxnet malware spread via infected USB drives into air-gapped Iranian nuclear facilities.
Tools Used: USB drives, malicious executable payloads, and zero-day exploits.
Impact: Physical damage to centrifuges at nuclear enrichment facilities, demonstrating the destructive potential of removable media-based attacks.
Chelsea Manning / WikiLeaks Incident (2010):
Scenario: Manning exfiltrated classified U.S. military and diplomatic documents using CDs and removable storage.
Tools Used: Writable CDs, USB media, and personal laptops.
Impact: Global diplomatic fallout, significant military intelligence leaks, and widespread public disclosure of sensitive information.
Insider Threat at Tesla (2018):
Scenario: A disgruntled employee allegedly transferred sensitive manufacturing data onto removable media.
Tools Used: USB drives and external storage devices.
Impact: Potential exposure of proprietary manufacturing information and trade secrets, legal actions, and internal investigations.
Sony Pictures Entertainment Breach (2014):
Scenario: Attackers reportedly used removable media to exfiltrate sensitive data from internal network systems.
Tools Used: USB drives and external storage devices.
Impact: Severe reputational damage, public disclosure of internal communications, financial loss, and business disruption.